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TAXATION - INTERSTATE COMMERCE - STATE TAXATION OF GASOLINE OF INTERSTATE MoTOR CARRIERS - An Arkanas statute 1 required the
.payment of the state tax on all gasoline carried into the state in motor vehicle
fuel tanks in excess of 20 gallons. The revenue therefrom was applied for
highway purposes. Appellee's buses traveled four different routes, two from
Memphis through Arkansas to St. Louis and two from Memphis to cities in
Arkansas. For the Memphis-St. Louis trip, 68 gallons were required, only 16
of them being used in Arkansas. These 68 gallons, plus Io extra ones, were
placed in the tank at Memphis. On arrival at the Arkansas line, each bus still
had 77 gallons and Arkansas sought to tax each gallon in excess of 20. The
evidence showed that on all routes appellee's buses covered about u88 miles
each day over Arkansas highways and that each bus used about one gallon of
gas every five miles. Appellee unsuccessfully sought an injunction in the federal

1

Ark. Acts (1933), No. 67.
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district court against collection of this tax. 2 The circuit court of appeals reversed
this ruling and granted the injunction. 8 On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, held, affirmed, the imposition of the tax in this particular case being an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce since it bore no reasonable relation to the use of Arkansas highways by appellee.4 Justices Black, Frankfurter,
and Douglas dissented. McCarroll 'll, Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., (U. S.
1940) 60 S. Ct. 504.
· In I 919 Oregon adopted the first gasoline tax and in the following decade
every state in the nation joined the ranks. 5 Naturally the tax rates adopted were
of varying amounts, ranging from two to seven cents per gallon. 6 Thus in
going from state to state, it has proved profitable for operators of motor vehicles
to buy as much gasoline as possible in a state charging a lower tax. It was to
check such evasion that the Arkansas statute here was passed, it being reasonable
to assume in most cases that amounts over 20 gallons in tanks of vehicles entering
the state were purchased with intent to evade buying gasoline in Arkansas.7
However, the main group to suffer from such a provision has been the interstate bus companies, whose termini are in different states. The buses take on
large amounts of gasoline at the start of interstate trips mainly to avoid the
inconvenience of refueling en route rather than to evade paying the higher
tax in Arkansas. 8 Thus there are two competing interests present: (I) the
interest of the interstate carriers in operating in an efficient manner,° and ( 2)
the interest of the state in collecting compensatory taxes from those interstate
carriers who use heavy vehicles on its highways and in subjecting them to the
same burden that intrastate carriers already bear.10 Having determined which
2
Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. McCarroll, (D. C. Ark. 1938) 22 F. Supp.
985, noted in 37 MICH, L. REV. 681 (1939).
8 Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. McCarroll, (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) IOI F.
(2d) 572, noted in 24 lowA L. REv. 796 (1939).
4
Justice McReynolds wrote the opinion of the court. Justice Stone wrote a concurring opinion, setting forth the reasons for the holding more fully, to which Chief
Justice Hughes and Justices Roberts and Reed agreed.
5
"Never before in the history of taxation has a tax been so universally accepted
in so short a period." CRAWFORD, THE GASOLINE TAX IN THE UNITED STATES: 1934,
p. 1 (1935).
6
See the tables in CRAWFCJIR.D, THE GASOLINE TAX IN THE UNITED STATES:
1934, p. 6 (1935), and TAX SYSTEMS OF THE WoRLD, 7th ed., 168 (1938).
7
Arkansas has a 6¾ cent tax and is surrounded by Missouri, with a 3 cent tax,
Oklahoma and Texas, with 4 cent taxes, Louisiana, with a 5 cent tax, Mississippi, with
a 6 cent tax, and Tennessee, with a 7 cent tax.
8
This is shown by the fact that most of the gasoline involved here was bought
in Tennessee, with a 7 cent tax. Thus it would have been cheaper to have bought the
gasoline in Arkansas, with only a 6¾ cent tax, if that were the sole motive.
9
It might have been argued that the method used to enforce the tax unreasonably
hampered the interstate carrier or that it violated the "tolls" provision of federal aid
highway legislation, but neither appears to have been advanced in the principal case,
There is little likelihood of the Court upholding such arguments, anyway. See Kauper,
"State Taxation of Interstate Motor Carriers," 3 2 MICH, L. REv, I at 34, note
122 (1933).
10
The state court in Sparling v. Refunding Board, 189 Ark. 189, 71 S. W. (2d)
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interest should prevail, the Court has at its beck and call proper constitutional
principles to justify either result. Thus the majority, feeling that the carrier's
interest should predominate here, tacitly emphasized one phase of the hoary
immunity doctrine-that interstate commerce is immune from any direct burden or tax, however nondiscriminatory. In the case of gasoline taxes, this principle is epitomized by Helson v. Kentucky,11 holding invalid a tax on the use
of gasoline in interstate commerce, ·which has since kept the Court busy finding
exceptions and modifications.12 It was one of these exceptions that the minority
seized upon to justify Arkansas' action-the principle that a state may tax
interstate commerce directly to compensate for the use of its highways by interstate carriers.18 But this principle is hedged by the requirement that "It must
appear on the face of the statut~ or be demonstrable that the tax as laid is
measured by or has some fair relationship to the use of the highways for which
the charge is made." 1-1 It was precisely at this point that the great cleavage of
the Court occurred. The minority claimed that the proper relationship existed,
for if all the routes were taken together and if each bus carried only enough
gasoline to complete that particular trip, the daily tax on amounts over 20
gallons would be less than a tax on gasoline actually consumed in Arkansas
in one day; the fact that this tax might result in smaller reserves being carried is
no more to be condemned than is the fact that some vehicles are barred under
state laws regulating size and weight. But in making these calculations, the
minority appears to have added weight to what the majority was trying to
prove-that the measure of the use of the highway can be more accurately and
simply made by calculating from known statistics the actual consumption of
gasoline in Arkansas and that when this is compared with the actual measure
used, the excess of that taxed over that actually consumed is too great to be
allowed.15 The fact that the spread between the two would have bei:n less had
182 (1934), had pointed out that the revenue from this tax went for construction and
maintenance of highways.
11. 279 U. S. 245, 49 S. Ct. 279 (1929).
12 See Kauper, "State Taxation of Interstate Motor Carriers," 3 2 MxcH. L. REV.
I at 25 ff. (1933).
18 In legal theory, this is a tax on the use of the highways in interstate commerce
measured by the use of gasoline rather than an invalid tax on the use of gasoline
in interstate commerce. Justice Stone, concurring in Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U. S.
245 at 252, 49 S. Ct. 279 (1929), suggested the further refinement that a tax on
property, measured by its use or use value in interstate commerce, would be valid.
These distinctions are as microscopic as that between holding invalid a tax on gross
receipts of an interstate business and holding valid the very same tax when imposed
in lieu of a property tax, it being considered that the gross receipts are just a measure
of the tax. See Johnson, "Multi-State Taxation of Interstate Sales," 27 CAL. L. REV.
549 (1939).
14 Justice Stone concurring in the principal case, 60 S. Ct. at 506, citing the
leading case of Interstate Transit v. Lindsey, 283 U. S. 183 at 186, 51 S. Ct. 380
(1931); and Sprout v. City of South Bend, 277 U. S. 163 at 170, 48 S. Ct. 502
(1928); Bingaman v. Golden Eagle Western Lines, 297 U. S. 626 at 628, 56 S. Ct,
624 (1936); Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U. S: 407, 56 S. Ct. 756 (1936); Ingels v.
Morf, 300 U.S. 290 at 294, 57 S. Ct. 439 (1937).
15 The excess on all routes was substantial; on the Memphis-St. Louis rua, it was
over I 50 gallons a day. Principal case, 60 S. Ct. at 507.
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the buses carried less gasoline would seem to be indulging in a bit of wishful
thinking. Thus a state may levy a gasoline use tax on interstate carriers only
on the basis of gasoline actually consumed within that state. Any gasoline carried
for use in other states is immune. From a practical standpoint, the measure used
by the Arkansas statute is too rough and unc_ertain to attain this required goal
in many cases; taxing the excess of 20 gallons can only be upheld if that excess
closely approximates the amount actually consumed in Arkansas. Since this
necessitates finding the actual consumption, it would be much easier and more
accurate to adopt the actual consumption as the basis for the tax. Few administrative difficulties would be encountered.16 It is noteworthy that the majority
failed to mention the plausible argument of the circuit court of appeals 17 that
the Arkansas tax as applied here would open the door to multiple burdens on
interstate commerce, in view of the prevailing popularity of this concept in
gross receipts tax cases.18 Once the state is limited to taxing the proportionate
!hare of the gasoline used within that state, however, the possibility of cumulative burdens has disappeared in legal contemplation.19 Of even greater interest
is the underlying theory expressed by the three dissenters that it is better to
leave the whole matter of interstate trade barriers to Congress, with its plenary
power over interstate commerce, rather than to depend upon the "spasmodic
and unrelated instances of litigation" in the courts. Until Congress does so
bring order out of the existing chaos, the courts should keep their hands off
any attempts by the states to control or tax interstate commerce in a nondiscriminatory manner. But perhaps the very reason why Congress has failed
ta do this is that the courts have been depended upon to furnish the guiding
light that is needed. Thus if Congress and the courts are to wait on each other
to work out a solution, the trade barriers will increase geometrically in the
meantime. It undoubtedly would be better to have some uniform and authoritative declaration of the scope of the interstate commerce clause by Congress, but
16 Less cumbersome methods would be required than in the case of the excess of
20 gallons measure. It would not be necessary to use ports of entry and exit to check
the gasoline used, or to depend on drivers' estimates, or to seal gasoline to be used in
other states. The actual records and data of common carriers are obtainable to work
out the actual consumption as in the principal case. Cf. 24 lowA L. REv. 796 (1939).
11
(C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 101 F. (2d) 572 at 576.
18
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 58 S. Ct. 546
(1938); Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913 (1938); Gwin,
White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 59 S. Ct. 325 (1939). However,
this idea has not been used to invalidate the general type of compensatory use taxes.
Henneford v. 1Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 57 S. Ct. 524 (1937) ;, Southern.
Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167, 59 S. Ct. 389 (1939); Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182, 59 S. Ct. 396 (1939). See Traynor, "State Taxation
and the Commerce Clause in the Supreme Court, 1938 Term," 28 CAL, L. REv. 168
at 183 (1940).
19
The state where the gasoline is sold may tax the full amount of the sale to
an interstate carrier and each state through which the carrier passes may tax the proportionate amount of the gasoline used therein. From an economic standpoint this is
double taxation, but legally the sale and the use are two different events that may be
taxed separately. See discussion in district court, (D. C. Ark. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 985 at
988.
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until- that occurs, the courts should not hesitate to use their slow process of
inclusion and exclusion to mark out what seems to them to be the proper bounds.
C. Eugene Gressman

